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Introduction
A central tenet of disaster risk management is reducing uncertainties to manage-
able risks, such that, where possible, probabilities of outcomes are known or at least 
predictable. Thus, the starting points for research and policy are to reduce uncer-
tainty through improved knowledge of hazard processes to enable better event 
forecasting, but also to understand better how information on risk is communicated 
and accessed, and the social and political processes that constrain what individ-
uals and organisations can do with such information – since early warning needs 
early and inclusive action. This approach has delivered considerable gains in regions 
exposed to weather extremes, including coastal lands and rainfall- dependent agri-
cultural communities.
One of the greatest global achievements for this style of risk- based science has 
been the reduction in the number of people killed and harmed by flood events 
since records began in the 1980s (UNISDR 2019). Global loss data are available 
from the 1980s to present, allowing long- term trend analysis over this period. This 
shows declining mortality even when the number of flood events has increased. 
Losses to property and people affected have increased over this period, indicating 
the further challenge of reducing risk that goes beyond effective evacuation. This 
success is as a direct outcome of reduced uncertainty across all aspects of flood 
warning and response drawing together inputs from natural and social sciences. 
This gain is especially impressive when seen alongside the increased number of 
reported flood events from all causes, and the increasing number of people made 
homeless and suffering property damage. Flood risk is increasing as more people 
and property are exposed to flood hazard, with climate change acting as a hazard 
multiplier, but reduced uncertainty in knowledge about the likelihood of outcomes 
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The success of this type of approach to reduce flood risk is important because 
it highlights the multiple factors required for success. Yet uncertainties are present 
in all areas of knowledge production and decision- making in the knowledge chain 
that underpins such early warnings. One of the key lessons from the success referred 
to is that reducing uncertainty in ways that can allow individuals to make decisions 
and avoid harm is best achieved through interdisciplinary knowledge production 
coupled with cross- sectoral policy action. The length of the knowledge produc-
tion chain is captured well by the World Meteorological Organisation HiWeather 
project (http:// hiweather.net) (Figure  9.1). This identifies six specific stages of 
technical expertise as components of a knowledge chain. At each step, different 
combinations of science are needed to address specific technical challenges, and 
so to better articulate knowledge and identify knowledge gaps to describe the sig-
nificance of remaining known uncertainties. Each of these stages helps describe 
known uncertainty brought about by incomplete data, modelling and theoretical 
assumptions and biases in understanding and communication. Because know-
ledge to reduce risk is produced across multiple stages, additional uncertainty is 
introduced through the transfer or exchange of data, understanding and infor-
mation from one site of expertise to another. Such exchanges often require data 
transformation, for example where model output and input work at different spa-
tial scales or where additional variables have to be interpolated to allow analysis. 
Although uncertainties may of course not be reduced through such a knowledge 
chain, the hoped- for result is not a compounding of but a reduction in uncertainty 
in understanding for the end- user: the citizen at risk contemplating evacuation. It 
is worth noting the origin of Figure 9.1, which reflects the ambition of weather 
forecasters to make their work as relevant as possible to end- users. The result in this 
figure is a representation of a knowledge chain that is linear and emphasises formal 
scientific knowledge. This allows a clear delimitation of opportunities to improve 
the quality of early warnings – through each stage and bridges between them. It 
also prompts the question ‘How would other actors view knowledge production?’ 
from a more bottom- up viewpoint. For example, it might be that these stages are 
compressed into compound acts of assessment, often including informal or local 
knowledge based on experience. It is likely, from this perspective, that the final deci-
sion stage might be more central.
FIGURE 9.1 The knowledge chain for flood early warning
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The historical progression in disaster studies from a hazard to a people- centred 
approach, and more recently to an integrative and multidisciplinary framing where 
a range of epistemic logics has been recognised (including local knowledge), has 
increased awareness of uncertainties and the ambiguities buried deep in multiple 
knowledge production and communication efforts. More than this, the extension 
of disaster studies into interdisciplinary analysis (where physical and social science 
approaches are blended or synthesised) – for example in risk analysis that combines 
hazard likelihood with the susceptibility, coping and adaptation of people and 
their asset systems – has brought to the surface the political nature of knowledge. 
Science does not have a unique claim on legitimacy for knowledge production, 
even where its methods are more transparent and defendable. Local knowledge 
based on personal experience and indigenous knowledge rooted in cultural iden-
tity are increasingly recognised as being part of the conversation out of which 
knowledge becomes relevant to specific decision- makers’ needs. Here the robust-
ness and transparency of the scientific method is also key in bringing account-
ability to decision- making and confidence to action. The scientific method, with 
its roots in replicability and falsification of analysis, brings clarity to linear questions 
of cause and effect – as exemplified in Figure 9.1. Recent innovations in disaster 
science have pushed at the boundaries of complexity theory, where cause and effect 
are less clearly connected – with multiple intervening and dynamic variables. This 
makes scientific work less transparent to non- experts. A  central dilemma facing 
disaster studies is how expert analysis interacts with other knowledge traditions in 
developing more integrated understandings.
Where different knowledge traditions are clear about embedded uncertainties 
and open to a reinterpretation of positions, together with evidence- based science, 
there is scope for a nuanced confrontation of uncertainty. Where science or other 
knowledge traditions reject each other’s assumptions, value positions and findings, 
uncertainty is likely to be ignored and improved outcomes are more difficult to 
anticipate.
Uncertainty has become more visible as research has expanded its knowledge 
base through interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary work and the increasing inclu-
sion of local/ traditional knowledge. There is much debate on how to best do 
this, from weather forecasting in a daily news bulletin to flagging future climate 
scenarios integrated with specific economic futures. The latter places less emphasis 
on describing uncertainty as a qualifier on analysis and rather works in a constant 
state of contestation where few complex concepts like poverty, vulnerability, resili-
ence or development have a concrete meaning or material expression.
The remainder of this chapter explores these two traditions from particular 
viewpoints, reflected in the authorship of this chapter. The next section, emerging 
from a social science perspective, examines the social construction of uncertainty 
and certitude within studies of social vulnerability and resilience in Africa, while the 
following section, taking a more physical science perspective, takes us from weather 
and climate science to an exploration of risk and uncertainty and the implications 
for earthquake science and modelling. Both sections reflect on a common set of 
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themes outlined in Box 9.1, to which we return again in conclusion to tease out 
similarities and differences between these two traditions of disaster risk research.
BOX 9.1 FOUR AREAS OF QUESTIONING TO EXPLORE THE 
POSITION OF UNCERTAINTY IN DIFFERENT KNOWLEDGE 
PRODUCTION CONTEXTS
Knowledge: Where does uncertainty or ambiguity sit? Is it inherent within 
the methodologies deployed, inherited from external inputs or consequential 
through the use others make of knowledge and data that have been produced?
Communication: How, if at all, is uncertainty communicated? Is this a major 
or minor aspect? Is the balance right or are disciplinary norms and expectations 
for the communication of uncertainty in need of revision?
Response: If we accept that uncertainties are always present in science and 
decision- making then are there progressive or productive uses to which uncer-
tainty can be put? What kinds of actors or discourses tend to dominate when 
the level of uncertainty is high? Can such actors be enabled to open space for 
more inclusive processes of knowledge production and progressive outcomes 
for knowledge application in decision- making?
Ethics: What are the ethical implications for researchers in managing uncer-
tainty and its communication? Is the existing ethical approach right for the 
complexities we face in integrating physical and social science with local or 
indigenous knowledge?
A social science perspective: uncertainty as a challenge for 
disaster risk management in Africa
Uncertainty presents a serious challenge for disaster risk management because 
it impedes pre- emption. As a consequence, precaution becomes imperative but 
difficult to achieve. Disaster prevention and management require the reduc-
tion of uncertainty  – or, more precisely, the translation of forms of uncer-
tainty and ignorance into calculable probabilities (i.e. risk). But what if this is 
not possible? What if disaster risk management cannot avoid knowledge gaps 
and unpredictable events? Embracing uncertainty first and foremost requires 
an understanding of its causes and consequences. Situations characterised by 
uncertainty may originate from lack of knowledge and experience, unprece-
dented events or new and unpredictable conditions. Climate change is a major 
driver of newly emerging uncertainties, especially in poor countries. This 
section of the chapter focuses on the social construction of uncertainty in the 
context of climate change and natural disasters in Africa. The African continent 
is often portrayed as the continent that is most seriously affected by climate 
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coping capacities (IPCC AR- 5 2014). This raises a number of questions: How 
is uncertainty socially constructed and communicated? In which way are real 
and constructed uncertainties related? And how does this matter for disaster 
risk management? These themes are explored in the four sub- sections below, 
linking to the questions posed in Box 9.1.
Uncertainty, just like risk, can be viewed from a realist and from a construct-
ivist perspective. The realist perspective claims to build upon scientifically produced 
‘facts’. It acknowledges that some aspects of the future are simply not predictable, 
such as events related to tipping points, complex human– environment relations 
and unforeseeable system changes. The constructivist perspective, on the other 
hand, embraces people´s perceptions, imaginations and feelings of unknown futures 
(Cooper and Pratten 2015). It refers to the ways in which individuals or societies 
live with uncertainty, how they get  along with insufficient knowledge and how 
they navigate their future without a clear vision of what to expect. From a con-
structivist view, the shapes and contents of both knowledge and uncertainty are 
partly constituted not just by ‘the facts’ (as highlighted in the realist view), but by 
social orders acting on the processes of knowledge production. In other words: to a 
realist, knowledge (and uncertainty) are effectively shaped solely by the conditions 
of the focal objects; to a constructivist they are also shaped by the conditions of the 
subjects of knowledge.
The distinction between realist and constructivist concepts is important because 
human behaviour does not so much respond to the world as it is, but rather as it is 
perceived. In practice, however, ‘real’ and ‘socially constructed’ uncertainties are dif-
ficult to differentiate, as can be seen in the context of climate change.
Climate- related uncertainties in Africa can be traced back to diverse origins 
(IPCC AR- 5 2014; Niang et al. 2014). First, the future effects of climate change on 
the continent are expected to be highly heterogeneous in space. As a consequence, 
place- specific predictions are often quite inaccurate. While most of the continent is 
likely to receive less rainfall, eastern Africa will probably receive more – but highly 
erratic – rains. Second, model- based forecasts of future climate change in Africa are 
less refined than in other parts of the world due to a relatively weak data base and 
short time of observation. Third, environmental change is caused not by climate 
alone but by complex human– environment interactions that cannot be predicted. 
Fourth, societal transformations play an essential role in future disaster risks and 
coping capacities in Africa, but they are not predictable. And, finally, cross- scalar 
influences and power relations are decisive for local agency and the struggle for 
control.
A recent IPCC special report mentions the impact of climate change on 
growing disparities and social disintegration in Africa (IPCC 2019). It leaves no 
doubt that there has been an increased frequency of droughts in African drylands 
over the past few decades, which, together with population pressure, exacerbates 
land degradation. This is affecting the productivity of land use systems in large parts 
of the continent, leading to a deterioration of food security and local livelihoods. 
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telecoupling1 and socially differentiated effects on women, the elderly and the 
poor (IPCC 2019: 17). 
To give an example, the Afar pastoralists in Ethiopia have a long experience of 
living with multiple risks, including highly variable rainfall, recurring droughts and 
famines, sudden outbursts of violent clashes and disruptions of trade connections 
and markets due to changing international relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Djibouti and Somalia (Müller- Mahn et  al. 2010). The overlapping livelihood 
challenges are today further enhanced by newly emerging uncertainties. Rainfall 
anomalies are occurring more frequently. The expansion of irrigated farms and 
new infrastructure reduces access to pasture lands, while the uncontrollable inva-
sion of alien species undermines rangeland quality. Under these conditions, the Afar 
feel that they are surrounded by enemies. They experience uncertainty not only in 
terms of unpredictability, but – worse than that – as a situation in which they are 
losing control over what is happening, and the capacity to cope.
The social construction of uncertainty is based on communication among actors 
about shared future visions. In situations where the outcome of ongoing processes 
cannot be foreseen, and where future conditions remain concealed, decision- 
making lacks clear reference points. People are therefore searching for collective 
orientations. They rely on each other in order to obtain clues for decision- making. 
Communication over uncertainties may lead to ‘fictional expectations’ (Beckert 
2016): in other words, shared imaginations regarding what is going to happen in 
the future. These joint expectations are essential for making people act collectively. 
By sharing visions of the future, people come to an understanding about what may 
be expected, or feared, and how to prepare for it.
Experts and lay people frame uncertainty differently, which has consequences 
for how uncertainties are responded to. While experts encounter uncertainty as 
a limitation of scientific methods, forecasts and planning, others instead view it as 
a quotidian experience, something they cannot influence – and thus have to take 
for granted. Against this backdrop, communication among and between experts 
and lay people becomes important in order to find common understandings and 
orientations.
To give another example, a case study in Côte d’Ivoire revealed how farming 
communities respond to climate- related uncertainties that go beyond the ‘normal’ 
rainfall variability of previous years (Müller- Mahn et al. 2020). Over the past two 
decades many farmers adopted new crop varieties that are more resilient to dry 
spells, or they shifted cultivation to areas with better water supplies. But today the 
increasingly unpredictable onset of the rainy season makes it extremely difficult for 
farmers to decide when to start cultivation. They cannot fully rely on traditional 
experience, nor do they trust the weather forecasts. While people are waiting for 
the beginning of the rainy season, the feeling of uncertainty among community 
members passes through stages of unrest, hope and despair. People communicate 
intensively over their assessment of the situation, with the effect that some simply 
follow the practices they know, while others feel more inclined towards new strat-
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How can the uncertainties of drought and famine be responded to in practice? 
Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance have developed a number 
of instruments for that purpose, which aim at strengthening local resilience against 
drought, or improving external assistance to alleviate its consequences. An example 
of a resilience- building approach is the drought cycle management model. It 
provides a disaster risk management strategy that uses the periods between droughts 
to prepare for the next one by better linking activities of development, relief and 
rehabilitation. The approach is based on an analysis of the underlying causes of vul-
nerability at household levels and the dynamic pressures that enhance vulnerability 
further, and an assessment of coping capacities and disaster preparedness (Brüntrup 
and Tsegai 2017).
An example of improved external assistance is the Famine Early Warning 
Systems Network that is used for the organisation of famine relief. FEWSNET is an 
information platform that provides data on current and expected food insecurities 
at country and regional levels for most parts of the world, including all of Africa 
(see:  https:// fews.net/ ). It was established by the US Agency for International 
Development in 1985, and it has since helped to manage food crises more effect-
ively by analysing data on rainfalls, yields, markets, prices and regional food stocks. 
These data are combined with observations on local livelihoods, trade and the polit-
ical environment. FEWSNET publishes monthly bulletins that classify the observed 
state of food insecurity, from stress to emergency and famine. Such early warning 
systems use scenarios that link the observation of present food security assessments 
with informed assumptions about future events. Based on these assumptions and 
future scenarios, it is possible to prepare for emerging crises, for example by con-
centrating food stocks in regions that are expected to be most seriously affected.
However, critical voices point out that the combination of drought cycle man-
agement and famine early warning is insufficient to overcome the challenges of 
uncertainty. Managing the uncertainties of drought and famine in Africa more 
effectively would require a better integration between short- term humanitarian 
assistance, long- term development and political activities to support peace and 
human security. This is often lacking, especially in areas affected by violent conflicts, 
such as Somalia (Medinilla et al. 2019).
In designing responses to climate uncertainty, ethical implications arise 
concerning the acknowledgement of local knowledge, felt needs and local 
perspectives. Uncertainty does not only present a challenge for the future, it also 
represents an opportunity:  can uncertainty open up new spaces for alternative 
developments, innovation and desirable futures?
Uncertainty in Africa, like anywhere else, may concern all aspects of life, with 
negative as well as positive connotations (Cooper and Pratten 2015). This raises 
the question whether there is anything special about uncertainty in Africa. The 
understanding of uncertainty in Africa is embedded in the historical relations 
between the global North and South. This relationship has stimulated controversial 
debates about the dynamics of contemporary world society, and about uncertainty 
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debates on the concepts of ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) and ‘imagined futures’ (Beckert 
2016) are informed by the historical experience of the industrialised North, where 
technological risks are seen as unavoidable side- effects of modernity. It would, how-
ever, be misleading to view the global South simply in juxtaposition to this, as the 
realm of uncertainty, where future changes in nature and society cannot be properly 
predicted and managed (Bloemertz et al. 2012).
A physical science perspective: the challenges of forecasting 
earthquakes
On 28 March 2005 the magnitude 8.7 Nias earthquake ruptured the Sunda 
megathrust fault where the Indo- Australian plate is being forced under the Eurasian 
plate. The earthquake, at the time the fourth biggest ever instrumentally recorded, 
produced strong shaking in the islands of the Sumatran forearc and along the 
densely populated west Sumatran coastline, causing significant damage and more 
than 1,000 deaths (Hsu et al. 2005). While the impact of such a large earthquake was 
not surprising, and perhaps less severe than might have been expected, this earth-
quake was unique in that its approximate location and energy release had been fore-
cast in a paper that was published in an international peer- reviewed science journal 
only 11 days previously (McCloskey et al. 2008). On the one hand, this forecast 
could be viewed as a confirmation of the physical understanding of crustal physics 
that enabled it, but, on the other, for many – including its authors – it confirmed 
the fundamental intractability of earthquake prediction: a step change in precision 
from forecasting where, when and how big future events might be.
Earthquakes communicate by stress transfer. A  large earthquake deforms the 
earth’s crust around it, changing the stress field on neighbouring earthquake faults 
(Stein 1999; King et  al. 1994), bringing some closer to failure and triggering 
aftershocks, some of which can be very large. In the decade before the Nias 
event, physical scientists had developed techniques for calculating this so- called 
Coulomb stress and identifying particular faults that were made more dangerous by 
the occurrence of any large earthquake (Hubert- Ferrari et al. 2000; Nalbant et al. 
1998). Statistical assessments of aftershock sequences had repeatedly demonstrated 
that these calculations had the ability to explain the distributions of triggered events 
(e.g. Toda et al. 2011). Estimation of the Coulomb stress from the great Sumatra- 
Andaman earthquake, which produced the Indian Ocean tsunami, resolved onto 
neighbouring active fault segments, combined with considerations of their seismic 
history, allowed researchers to suggest an increased risk that was confirmed by the 
Nias event.
Remarkably, the causative stress change was less than 0.1 megaPascal (Nalbant 
et al. 2005), which is less than the stress caused by a handshake. The precise mech-
anism whereby this geologically imperceptible perturbation broke the grip holding 
some small part of the opposing sides of the fault together is not properly under-
stood, but the resulting non- linear amplification of the rupture process eventu-












Disasters, humanitarianism and emergencies 135
and releasing energy equivalent to 1,000 times the bomb dropped by the US on 
Hiroshima. This avalanche of energy release was probably initiated 20km below the 
seafloor. The following paragraphs draw on this case, and other earthquake events, 
to explore the set of questions outlined earlier, from a physical science perspective.
Geophysical scientists frequently distinguish two sources of uncertainty. Aleatory, 
or statistical, uncertainty results from lack of knowledge of the time- varying state of 
a system – here, the precise distribution of the stress on, and the strength of, the Nias 
fault segment, the precise distribution of slip on the Sumatran- Andaman earth-
quake, and the precise history of tectonic stress accumulation on the plate interface. 
Epistemic – or systematic – uncertainty, by contrast, emerges from an insufficient 
understanding of the physical processes that govern the earthquake event. In this 
case, tectonic convergence of the plates increases their mutual stress for hundreds of 
years and interactions with neighbouring earthquakes increase it rapidly and locally. 
Thus, the forecast of the Nias event was successful because the epistemic uncer-
tainty in the problem was relatively small, the seismic and tectonic history were 
reasonably well understood, and the physical link between cause (the Sumatra- 
Andaman earthquake) and effect (the Nias earthquake) was well enough described 
by the equations governing the Coulomb stress calculations.
Perhaps more importantly, the problem was sufficiently well posed to promote 
the epistemic clarity of the physical process above the aleatory uncertainty in the 
initial conditions. While uncertainty in the precise initial conditions precluded spe-
cification of the exact hypocentral location, and lack of knowledge of the loading 
history precluded specification of the event origin time, the large area of inter-
action identified, and the lack of specificity in the forecast, cast the net wide enough 
that many different futures were consistent with a successful forecast. This does not 
imply any duplicity. Rather, it reflects a careful consideration of the physical process 
(through accurate calculation of the Coulomb stress resolved on large areas of appro-
priate active structures with a known seismic and tectonic history) maximising the 
chances of an accurate forecast over an unspecified time into the future.
While the location and size of a magnitude 8.7 earthquake being deterministic-
ally forecast 11 days before it happened might be considered a success of physical 
science, this success came at a very high price. Firstly, this case demonstrates that 
large earthquakes can be triggered by almost infinitesimally small perturbations, and 
that, despite the underpinning determinism of the process, this – paradoxically – 
probably precludes deterministic forecasting of particular events. The precision with 
which the initial conditions are required to be known 20km below the ocean 
floor makes such prediction of this, or any other, rupture initiation an impossibility. 
Secondly, the non- linear amplification of the initial rupture required to produce a 
massive failure is controlled by the detail of the stress on the Nias fault segment and 
recent observations expose the fractal complexity of earthquake slip, and suggest 
that slip, even after rupture initiation, is also inherently unpredictable. The earth-
quake is one possible outcome of a game of tectonic bagatelle and successive events 
on the same fault are completely different (Lindsay et al. 2016; Nic Bhloscaidh et al. 
2015; Philibosian et al. 2014).
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This – now rarely disputed – observation provides the final blow to hopes of 
useful deterministic earthquake forecasting. If it were possible to identify segments 
of active faults with a high likelihood of rupture in the near future, and if, as in the 
Nias case, previous history made it possible to estimate the likely magnitude of the 
impending earthquake, even then we would be unlikely to make useful forecasts. 
Consider, for example, how tsunamis are generated by megathrust earthquakes. 
Strain, accumulated over hundreds of years, depresses the near- shore sea floor by 
metres and large earthquakes rupture the plate interface, allowing this century- scale 
strain energy to be released in seconds, forcing the seafloor upward over a vast area 
and producing a 10 billion tonne bulge in the sea surface. The collapse of this bulge 
generates a tsunami, the impact of which might be expected to be related simply to 
the earthquake magnitude. However, several studies (McCloskey et al. 2008; Geist 
2002) have shown that this is not the case. Again, the non- linear amplification, this 
time of small differences in the relationship between water depth and earthquake 
slip, result in very different impacts when viewed, for example, from the coastal city 
of Padang in western Sumatra. Almost identical earthquakes on the same segment 
of the off- shore fault might produce a 50cm wave for the city or a 5m wave – 
killing no one or possibly hundreds of thousands (Borrero et  al. 2006). Similar 
numerical experiments examining the shaking produced by possible earthquake 
scenarios for Istanbul show similar divergence, both in wave amplitude measured at 
particular places and in estimated fatalities.
These observations have important philosophical as well as practical implications 
for the application of physical science to earthquake risk management. Despite 
undeniable advances in the understanding of the physical processes underlying large 
earthquakes, several seismic butterfly effects ensure that the outcome will always 
be a surprise (cf. Lay 2012). Consider a world in which earthquake physics was 
completely known and where Laplacian determinism2 would only require accurate 
assessment of the initial conditions fully to constrain the future (and the past). 
Even then, the hope that these initial conditions might be estimated with sufficient 
accuracy to yield actionable forecasts by the techniques of geology and geophysics 
are dashed by Lorenzian exponential3 (or even super- exponential) divergence of 
dynamical trajectories. The immutable aleatory uncertainty in our observations, 
no matter how good our epistemic understanding, forbids useful prediction of the 
outcome. In this world, conservative estimates of impact might wildly underesti-
mate the consequences of particular decisions and unfulfilled forecasts of the worst 
impacts would leave physical scientists exposed to accusations of crying wolf, fun-
damentally undermining their collective credibility.
What are the implications of this perspective for physical science in earth-
quake risk management? Many physical scientists now recoil from traditional 
pronouncements made with certainty and clarity that effectively made science 
and engineering the decision- makers in many development environments (cf. 
Chiarabba et al. 2009). For some, this is a cause for celebration but, spurious as this 
over- confidence might have been, the potential vacuum thus created is unlikely 
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reassessment of what can be learned by scientific risk estimation, and finding a more 
nuanced, and perhaps a more modest, role for its insights.
In the Global Challenges Research Fund Urban Disaster Risk Hub (www.
tomorrowscities.org), attempts are being made to use the enduring convening 
power of physical science simulation, rather than its certainty. In this approach, 
simulations of the consequences of particular development choices are used to con-
vene multidisciplinary teams of decision- makers who provide multiple perspectives 
to illuminate complex development decisions. Rather than usurping decision 
authority, science now becomes a tool for decision support. Rather than scientists 
providing definitive forecasts, they relegate the consequences of immutable alea-
tory uncertainty and promote the epistemic certainty of well- constrained physical 
principles to a supporting role in a multidisciplinary process. Time will tell if this is 
a more effective, sustainable role for geophysical science.
Conclusion
Responding to the questions posed in Box 9.1, the accounts of uncertainty 
presented here, from quite different perspectives and in very different contexts, 
agree on four fundamental properties of knowledge production in the context of 
disaster risk management and international development:
Uncertainty is prevalent throughout disaster research. Uncertainty is a product of 
the complexities of physical and social processes and their interactions. There are 
some areas that are more predictable than others: flood risk as a consequence of 
upstream river catchment rainfall and river level rise is highly predictable when all 
catchment characteristics are known in detail. However, anticipating the probabil-
ities of outcomes becomes difficult where non- linear physical or social processes 
distance observable phenomena from potential outcomes – in time, space and scale. 
It is much harder to predict flooding accurately in urban catchments due to the 
complexity and dynamism of land use, or to predict earthquakes based on observ-
able changes in crustal stress.
As knowledge has grown, so has awareness of the uncertainties that constrain this know-
ledge. Researchers have been very successful in their mission to resolve knowledge 
gaps in the understanding and predictability of social and physical systems behav-
iour. However, the history of disaster studies shows that greater depth of know-
ledge, while offering specific insights, tends then to reveal further the complexity, 
context- specificity and ambiguity of revealed knowledge.
Uncertainties are likely to continue into the future and so must be embraced. Research 
that seeks to push forward the frontiers of knowledge is key to scientific endeavour 
and its social contribution. It is tempting for researchers to claim to have reduced 
uncertainty through their work. For research findings to be useful to society it is 
important also to recognise that uncertainties remain even as knowledge grows. 
The pressures on academics to publish results that emphasise comprehensiveness 
and certainty does not allow broader uncertainties embedded in question framing, 
methodology and interpretation to be fully expressed. This is compounded in 
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aggregate reviews and integrated assessments, where uncertainties may be system-
atically overlooked. This challenge is especially important for disaster risk studies, 
which are often interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary. With knowledge crossing 
domains of expertise it becomes more difficult for researchers to bring expert 
judgement to questions of uncertainty embedded in research processes and yet not 
made explicit through publication or other formal reporting.
Managing the presentation of uncertainty is a challenge for scientists working with 
policy- makers and the public, who look to science to reduce uncertainty. The case of 
L’Aquila in Italy, where seven public officials were tried for having allegedly 
given out misleading and incorrect information to the public before the 6 
April 2009 earthquake, has highlighted how exposed scientific comment (and 
scientists) can be when knowledge is taken into politicised and emotive contexts 
(Alexander 2014). There remains a popular assumption that the role of science is 
to make the world more understandable, not to reveal its uncertainties. Indeed, 
the public legitimacy of scientists as ‘speakers of truth through evidence’ rests 
on this. As science moves more deeply into researching the behaviour of non- 
linear systems and processes of production of risks and uncertainties, so the gap 
between popular (and political) expectations of science, and the actual practice 
of science, grows.
These four fundamentals of uncertainty within the context of disaster studies 
reveal an increasing tendency for science to move from providing society with 
increased certainty and having its legitimacy built on bringing clarity, towards 
a situation where natural, physical and social science is one arbiter among 
other arbiters of diverse knowledges that are always partial and contingent. This 
challenge matches the movement of science from providing linear to providing 
non- linear conceptualisations of nature and society. The value of natural and 
physical science in offering a transparent and robust way into the uncertainty of 
non- linear systems, and a key challenge for the future, is to continue to commu-
nicate the value of the contribution of a broader interdisciplinary science. This 
does not mean that only the formal natural- physical scientific methodology is 
legitimate – but it does emphasise the importance of a particular type of quan-
titative rigour in the presentation of underlying conceptual and methodological 
frameworks, and the ability to communicate these in non- specialist language to 
allow such contributions to grow into the interdisciplinary spaces demanded of 
complex and non- linear phenomena.
At the same time, there is a danger that the technical expertise needed to 
understand such cutting-edge research could push this type of science into elite 
spaces – with only experts being seen as having the analytical tools to make sense 
of uncertainty; or that the burden for decision- making under uncertainty is unrea-
sonably placed into the hands of local actors with constrained access to appropriate 
interpretive tools. Instead, researchers have a responsibility to work with uncer-
tainty in disaster management as a mechanism for the levelling of formal expertise. 
Realising this opportunity is perhaps the greatest challenge facing contemporary 
research that aims to make a difference in the world.
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Notes
 1 Telecoupling refers to interactions between distant social-ecological systems (Hull and Liu 
2018).
 2 The mathematician Pierre Simon Laplace argued, in 1814, that if we knew the precise 
location and momentum of every atom in the universe, the entire past and future could 
be calculated from the laws of classical mechanics. Thus, if we knew the physical law per-
fectly (no epistemic uncertainty), knowledge of the precise state of the fault would allow 
the perfect description of all past and future events.
 3 Ed Lorenz was the meteorologist who, in his paper of 1963, first described the butterfly 
effect. Tiny changes in initial conditions are amplified through dynamics to render the 
future extremely unpredictable.
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